{"id":7324,"date":"2018-05-23T16:59:35","date_gmt":"2018-05-23T16:59:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/?p=7324"},"modified":"2019-01-23T22:12:14","modified_gmt":"2019-01-23T22:12:14","slug":"my-evidence-to-the-uk-treasurys-digital-currencies-inquiry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/2018\/05\/23\/my-evidence-to-the-uk-treasurys-digital-currencies-inquiry\/","title":{"rendered":"My evidence to the UK Treasury&#8217;s Digital Currencies Inquiry"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The written evidence I submitted to UK Parliament, as requested by the Treasury&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.parliament.uk\/business\/committees\/committees-a-z\/commons-select\/treasury-committee\/inquiries1\/parliament-2017\/digital-currencies-17-19\/\">Digital Currencies Inquiry,<\/a> is <a href=\"http:\/\/data.parliament.uk\/writtenevidence\/committeeevidence.svc\/evidencedocument\/treasury-committee\/digital-currencies\/written\/82206.html\">finally up!<\/a><\/p>\n<p>For all the written evidence, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.parliament.uk\/business\/committees\/committees-a-z\/commons-select\/treasury-committee\/inquiries1\/parliament-2017\/digital-currencies-17-19\/publications\/\">click here<\/a> and hit &#8220;View all&#8221;\u00a0\u2014 there were forty-eight submissions. Blockchain skeptics will particularly enjoy <a href=\"http:\/\/data.parliament.uk\/writtenevidence\/committeeevidence.svc\/evidencedocument\/treasury-committee\/digital-currencies\/written\/82215.html\">Jorge Stolfi&#8217;s.<\/a><\/p>\n<p>There will be a second oral evidence session\u00a0\u2014 Martin Walker was amazing at <a href=\"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/2018\/05\/02\/news-uk-treasury-digital-currencies-inquiry-ethereum-as-a-security-bitcoin-cash-mining-for-charity\/\">the first<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 though it probably won&#8217;t feature me, sadly.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/2018\/05\/23\/my-evidence-to-the-uk-treasurys-digital-currencies-inquiry\/david-mcbee-round-gold-coloured-bitcoin\/\" rel=\"attachment wp-att-7332\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-7332\" src=\"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/david-mcbee-round-gold-coloured-bitcoin.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"600\" height=\"423\" srcset=\"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/david-mcbee-round-gold-coloured-bitcoin.jpg 923w, https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/david-mcbee-round-gold-coloured-bitcoin-300x211.jpg 300w, https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/david-mcbee-round-gold-coloured-bitcoin-768x541.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><small><a href=\"https:\/\/www.pexels.com\/photo\/round-gold-colored-bitcoin-730557\/\">Round Gold-colored Bitcoin by David McBee<\/a>, CC-0 \u2014 the stock image favoured by the Treasury.<\/small><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3>Evidence submitted by David Gerard (DGC0052)<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Digital Currencies Inquiry: written evidence submitted by David Gerard<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I am David Gerard, author of <em>Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain<\/em>, a critical book on cryptocurrency and blockchains. I write a news blog of the same name on the crypto space, and speak and consult on the topic. I have been asked to submit evidence to this inquiry.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Executive summary:<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are inefficient payment systems, because they were constructed to fulfil fringe political aims.<\/li>\n<li>Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology are terms used to market mundane technologies as fulfilling the spectacular promises of Bitcoin \u2014 promises at which it has already failed.<\/li>\n<li>The cryptocurrency and blockchain space is rife with at best unrealised claims, and at worst outright fraud.<\/li>\n<li>The present Know Your Customer\/anti-money-laundering regulation is appropriate.<\/li>\n<li>Cryptocurrency products should not be marketed to consumers or retail investors.<\/li>\n<li>US regulatory agencies are tightening regulation, in an appropriate manner.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Are digital currencies ultimately capable of replacing traditional means of payment?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1. I will assume \u201cdigital currencies\u201d here to mean decentralised cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, and possibly centrally-controlled cryptocurrencies such as Ripple.<\/p>\n<p>2. The problem with Bitcoin as a payment system is that it was never designed to be a good payment system, one that could outperform present digital payment systems \u2014 it was constructed as a political project, and political considerations overrode any concerns of efficiency.<\/p>\n<p>3. The political aims of Bitcoin were as a project to advocate anarcho-capitalist and Austrian School economic ideals and a digital gold standard. The requirements were a system with strictly regulated issuance \u2014 rather than monetary policy \u2014 with Bitcoin\u2019s creator, the pseudonymous \u201cSatoshi Nakamoto,\u201d explicitly comparing it to gold, and condemning the financial system and the fact that central banks can issue money without backing. The online subculture Bitcoin was created and nurtured in was explicit in its anarcho-capitalist politics, and it attracted many people of these leanings.<\/p>\n<p>4. (The political history of Bitcoin\u2019s origins is best documented in <a name=\"title\"><\/a><a name=\"productTitle\"><\/a><em>The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism<\/em> (2016) by David Golumbia, a professor at Virginia Commonwealth University in the US.<a name=\"_ftnref1\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>5. This means that Bitcoin was founded on political ideas that had already shown themselves to be inadequate to the function of a modern economy. This means it had a number of problems from the outset.<\/p>\n<p>6. Nakamoto required decentralisation \u2014 that there was no central controlling body that any user of the system had to trust. The problem is that decentralised systems are vastly less efficient than centrally controlled ones. This is reflected in the stupendous waste of power involved in Bitcoin\u2019s \u201cproof of work\u201d mining system, where it uses 0.1% of the world\u2019s total electricity consumption, or an amount comparable to the entire Republic of Ireland.<a name=\"_ftnref2\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> This is to achieve a transaction rate of approximately 7 transactions per second, total worldwide across all of Bitcoin.<\/p>\n<p>7. The purpose of decentralisation is to ensure that Bitcoin transactions are irreversible \u2014 so that no transaction may be censored, and no Bitcoins may be taken from someone without their cryptographic consent. This has the side-effect that the system is extremely brittle to errors and thefts, which cannot be reversed \u2014 if you make a mistake, you lose your Bitcoins; if someone hacks your Bitcoins, you can&#8217;t get them back. Irreversibility is marketed to merchants as \u201cno chargebacks\u201d \u2014 but, while merchants dislike the possibility of chargebacks, they dislike more payment methods that customers won\u2019t use; and customers overwhelmingly prefer electronic payment methods to have the possibility of chargebacks.<\/p>\n<p>8. Deflation was explicitly designed into Bitcoin \u2014 Nakamoto put forward as a positive for Bitcoin that it would go up in price, with greater demand and use. This did indeed happen \u2014 although the price rise was from speculation \u2014 but the problem was that deflation disincentivises use of a currency; if your money is worth more tomorrow, you won\u2019t spend it today. This was observed in practice \u2014 when merchants did add Bitcoin as a payment method, it mostly wasn\u2019t used, as even Bitcoin advocates prefer to hold rather than spend, and the general public were not attracted to Bitcoins when they could use conventional currency over a channel that allowed chargebacks.<\/p>\n<p>9. Bitcoin transactions were fast and free until mid-2015, when it hit capacity, and transactions suddenly went up in price and were subject to delays. By December 2017, the average fee for one Bitcoin transaction was $55. This shook off most of the remaining legitimate merchants.<\/p>\n<p>10. The one successful merchant use case for Bitcoin was on black markets, and particularly the darknet drug markets. As well as the uncensorability of transactions, there was a widespread (if erroneous) perception that Bitcoin was anonymous. It is instructive to note that even the drug market doesn\u2019t like using Bitcoin \u2014 apart from transactions being expensive and slow, the price of Bitcoin is sufficiently volatile, at 5%-10% a day, that a deal could be messed up by price changes by the time it finally went through. The darknet drug markets have increasingly moved to other cryptocurrencies.<\/p>\n<p>11. Since Bitcoin was open source code, anyone could copy it to make their own cryptocurrency, and so there are thousands of Bitcoin copies, or \u201caltcoins.\u201d While these are usable as long as they don\u2019t suffer a similar transaction clog, they have not solved the problems of a decentralised cryptocurrency. The second most popular cryptocurrency, Ethereum, is having intermittent transaction clogs similar to those that befell Bitcoin.<\/p>\n<p>12. Bitcoin has also lost its decentralisation \u2014 since proof of work mining has economies of scale, the natural tendency is to recentralise. By early 2014, most mining had formed into a few large mining pools. Bitcoin is now mostly mined by four or five large pools. Altcoins tend to be even more centralised. Miners with a sufficient percentage of the mining power have the power to stop transactions going through \u2014 which affects the uncensorability of transactions.<\/p>\n<p>13. ICOs, offering tokens marketed as private currency but in practice being objects of speculation, typically run on top of a decentralised blockchain platform such as Ethereum, but are centrally-controlled by the issuer. These are most usefully treated as securities or investment vehicles.<\/p>\n<p>14. There is a great deal of work in computer science on mathematical constructs that can deliver the promises of Bitcoin \u2014 mostly decentralisation \u2014 without its problems with efficiency and transaction speed. So far none of these have delivered a robust working system fulfilling these promises \u2014 and many have been \u201csix months away\u201d for years. For the most part, their offerings in practice tend to be marketing their tokens, in the manner of ICOs.<\/p>\n<p>15. Given all of this, Bitcoin-style decentralised currencies are unlikely to outdo conventional payment systems in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n<p>16. Centrally-administered currencies such as Ripple do not suffer Bitcoin\u2019s inefficiencies or transaction speed problems, but (of course) are simply private payment systems that can be regulated appropriately. Similar systems are mooted for use in such proposals as central bank cryptocurrencies, <em>e.g.<\/em>, distributing pounds sterling via a centrally-administered blockchain-like construct.<\/p>\n<p><strong>To what extent could digital currencies disrupt the economy and the workings of the public sector?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>17. Bitcoin\u2019s main use case was illegal payments \u2014 financial crimes and money laundering. This has the possibility of social disruption. This has mostly been dealt with by firm control over the gateways between cryptocurrencies and conventional currencies \u2014 Know Your Customer laws at the exchanges, and banks requiring detailed information from customers on the provenance of cash deposits.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What risks and benefits could digital currencies generate for consumers, businesses and governments?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>18. It is important to note that all of Bitcoin\u2019s promises have already failed in Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies will only fulfil these promises while they are little-used.<\/p>\n<p>19. As such, the main consumer risk is that the space is rife with fraud, scams and criminals \u2014 as it is perceived as a get-rich scheme.<\/p>\n<p>20. This also carries the risk of retail-level investors losing all their money in extremely questionable investments. I consider it misselling to allow cryptocurrency marketing as an investment to retail-level investors; it is a profoundly risky trading environment.<\/p>\n<p>21. The main concerns with a central bank cryptocurrency are economics, rather than technology or fraud considerations \u2014 no more so than with any other form of cash, as it would be a different system for pounds as we know them.<\/p>\n<p>22. Cryptocurrency and blockchain enterprises tend to make spectacular promises, claiming that work is underway that will give results in a matter of months or a few years. These almost never eventuate. The sector is notorious for its high hype-to-production ratio.<\/p>\n<p>23. Blockchain marketing frequently puts forward future technological possibilities as if they are present-day systems you could buy off the shelf \u2014 the sector routinely confuses \u201ccould\u201d and \u201cis.\u201d One IBM marketing brochure from 2016, <em>Making Blockchain Ready for Business<\/em>,<a name=\"_ftnref3\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> includes the following claims:<\/p>\n<p>24. \u201can enterprise-class, cross-industry open standard for distributed ledgers that can transform the way business transactions are conducted globally\u201d<\/p>\n<p>25. \u201chighly secure blockchain services and frameworks that address regulatory compliance across financial services, government, and healthcare\u201d<\/p>\n<p>26. Note how both of these are phrased as if the systems offering this functionality exist now. No blockchain-based systems doing all of these things at once exist in 2018, let alone in 2016. <em>All<\/em> technological claims made by blockchain marketers require close and detailed questioning as to whether the technology in question even exists in production form in present time.<\/p>\n<p><strong>How is distributed ledger technology being applied in the financial services sector, and how might it be applied in future?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>27. The marketing of Bitcoin-related technologies to business started in earnest around late 2013 and early 2014 \u2014 and, because the word \u201cBitcoin\u201d was tainted due to its associations with drug markets and its 2013 asset bubble, the technology was promoted using the word \u201cblockchain.\u201d This was further euphemised in its marketing to the term \u201cdistributed ledger technology\u201d \u2014 a term which the earliest use I can find of is from 2013, referring specifically to Bitcoin.<a name=\"_ftnref4\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>28. It is important to note here that at every stage, the thing being marketed is Bitcoin promises, such as decentralisation, censorship resistance, the unalterable transaction record, spectacular effects on social organisation and so forth. One would think from the words that \u201cdistributed ledger\u201d could include shared Excel spreadsheets or Google Docs \u2014 but the term is used as a method of making outlandish-sounding Bitcoin promises without saying the word \u201cBitcoin\u201d. This is even as those very promises had already failed in Bitcoin.<\/p>\n<p>29. The useful aspect of Bitcoin is the blockchain data structure \u2014 an append-only ledger, made tamper-evident through cryptography. This is a construct known as a Merkle tree, first used in 1979, and widely used in computing since \u2014 nothing about it is new with Bitcoin.<\/p>\n<p>30. An append-only ledger, that anyone can check the integrity of, is obviously useful; as such, we now see \u201cblockchain\u201d or \u201cdistributed ledger technology\u201d used as marketing terms for such ledgers. Many of these are genuinely useful products \u2014 but, of course, a data structure does not produce the nigh-magical promises of Bitcoin. However, the spread of append-only ledgers \u2014 for those particular and specific applications in which they have a use case \u2014 is potentially good and useful.<\/p>\n<p>31. A prominent example is Guardtime\u2019s KSI Blockchain, the backbone of Estonia\u2019s \u201cblockchain\u201d efforts, which is not a blockchain at all \u2014 the software was first created in 2007, and the name was changed to \u201cblockchain\u201d in 2012 as part of Guardtime\u2019s marketing efforts, to great success. The power of the Bitcoin promises is such that KSI Blockchain is frequently put forward by advocates as good news for blockchains, and even good news for cryptocurrency \u2014 even though the software supplies only the tamper-evident timestamped data ledger.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What work has the Government (and its associated bodies) done to understand, prepare for and, where relevant, encourage changes that may be brought about by increased adoption of digital currencies?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>How might the Government\u2019s processes adapt should digital currencies be adopted more widely (e.g. tax implications, anti-money laundering measures)?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>32. The currencies themselves are not useful payment systems, except for black market purposes. As such, present efforts to properly regulate the gateways to and from conventional currency are appropriate.<\/p>\n<p>33. It would be appropriate to put into place strong consumer protection against misselling cryptocurrency enterprises as investments to retail-level investors. We presently see Tube advertisements for cryptocurrency exchanges \u2014 these should be banned as misselling, in the same manner as bans on Contracts for Difference, rolling spot forex, financial spread betting, binary options and similar financial instruments that are inappropriate for consumers and retail investors.<\/p>\n<p>34. It is possible that the efforts at new computer science, to create systems that fulfil the promises of Bitcoin without its severe technical limitations, might succeed to some degree. In such a circumstance, a cryptocurrency might be adopted more widely. However, the economic problems with the lack of a central issuing bank would remain; thus, they may not be very functional as currencies. The problems with fraudsters in such new and ill-regulated areas of finance would be similar to those we observe presently in the cryptocurrency world.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Is the government striking the right balance between regulating digital currencies to provide adequate protection for consumers and businesses whilst not stifling innovation?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>35. There needs to be more protection for retail investors against fraudulent schemes related to cryptocurrency.<\/p>\n<p>36. The main innovations cryptocurrency enterprises offer are end-runs around regulation. While this can lead to useful innovation in finance, financial novelty is historically greatly attractive to fraudsters.<\/p>\n<p>37. ICOs are much touted as a new method of enterprise fundraising with great possibilities. While I concur on the future possibilities of a hypothetical properly-regulated ICO sector, the problem at present is that almost all ICOs are functionally just highly manipulated and unregulated investment vehicles with near-fraudulent prospectuses. Fraud is rife in the sector.<\/p>\n<p>38. Cryptocurrency exchanges are all but unregulated. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the US has noted previously that common market frauds \u2014 wash trading, spoofing, painting the tape and so forth \u2014 are qualitatively worse on cryptocurrency exchanges than on conventional regulated commodities, futures and securities exchanges:<a name=\"_ftnref5\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>39. \u201cBeyond their practical and speculative functions, the emergence of these nascent markets has also been negatively marked by a variety of retail customer harm that warrants the Commission\u2019s attention, including, among other things, flash crashes and other market disruptions, delayed settlements, alleged spoofing, hacks, alleged internal theft, alleged manipulation, smart contract coding vulnerabilities, bucket shop arrangements and other conflicts of interest. These types of activities perpetrated by bad actors can inhibit market-enhancing innovation, undermine market integrity, and stunt further market development.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Could regulation benefit digital currency start-ups by improving consumer trust?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>40. This would be useful and appropriate. Innovation in finance is useful, but regulations exist for good reason, and particularly for consumers and retail investors.<\/p>\n<p><strong>How are governments and regulators in other countries approaching digital currencies and what lessons can the UK learn from overseas?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>41. FinCEN in the US has so far supplied useful guidance on regulation of gateways to and from conventional currencies, which has been broadly adopted in other countries.<a name=\"_ftnref6\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>42. The US Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have taken a light touch with regulation so far \u2014 they have stated the rules that apply, increasingly so since mid-2017 and the crypto market bubble and boom in ICOs.<a name=\"_ftnref7\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> They have only recently moved to action, including administrative orders, fines and, in egregious cases, arrests. Many consider they should have acted sooner.<\/p>\n<p>43. The New York State Attorney General\u2019s Office has recently started an inquiry into cryptocurrency exchanges \u2014 asking for basic details such as their banking arrangements, compliance arrangements and how they deal with common modes of fraudulent trading.<a name=\"_ftnref8\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftn8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> This is information regulators should have, and it is concerning that they generally do not. Exchanges such as Coinbase\/GDAX and Gemini \u2014 who both market themselves as regulated and trustworthy exchanges \u2014 have welcomed the inquiry, whereas Kraken (also US-based) has stated that the cryptocurrency sector does not want regulation, even to this level.<\/p>\n<p>May 2018<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn1\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> David Golumbia. <em>The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism<\/em>. University of Minnesota Press, 2016.<\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn2\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a> \u201cBitcoin Power Consumption Index.\u201d Digiconomist. <a href=\"https:\/\/digiconomist.net\/bitcoin-energy-consumption\">https:\/\/digiconomist.net\/bitcoin-energy-consumption<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn3\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a> Jeremy Cuomo. \u201cMaking Blockchain Ready for Business: Increase trust, accountability, and transparency across your business networks\u201d. IBM, 2016. <a href=\"https:\/\/www-01.ibm.com\/common\/ssi\/cgi-bin\/ssialias?htmlfid=XIM12353USEN&amp;\">https:\/\/www-01.ibm.com\/common\/ssi\/cgi-bin\/ssialias?htmlfid=XIM12353USEN&amp;<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn4\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a> JP Koning. \u201cWhy the Fed is more likely to adopt bitcoin technology than kill it off\u201d. 14 April 2013. <a href=\"http:\/\/jpkoning.blogspot.co.uk\/2013\/04\/why-fed-is-more-likely-to-adopt-bitcoin.html\">http:\/\/jpkoning.blogspot.co.uk\/2013\/04\/why-fed-is-more-likely-to-adopt-bitcoin.html<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn5\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a> Commodity Futures Trading Commission. \u201cRetail Commodity Transactions Involving Virtual Currency.\u201d Federal Register Volume 82, Number 243, Wednesday, December 20, 2017. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cftc.gov\/LawRegulation\/FederalRegister\/proposedrules\/2017-27421.html\">https:\/\/www.cftc.gov\/LawRegulation\/FederalRegister\/proposedrules\/2017-27421.html<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn6\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a> <em>e.g.<\/em>, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. \u201cApplication of FinCEN&#8217;s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies.\u201d March 18, 2013. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fincen.gov\/resources\/statutes-regulations\/guidance\/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering\">https:\/\/www.fincen.gov\/resources\/statutes-regulations\/guidance\/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn7\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a> US Securities and Exchange Commission. \u201cSEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities: U.S. Securities Laws May Apply to Offers, Sales, and Trading of Interests in Virtual Organizations.\u201d July 25, 2017. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sec.gov\/news\/press-release\/2017-131\">https:\/\/www.sec.gov\/news\/press-release\/2017-131<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<p><small><a name=\"_ftn8\"><\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref8\">[8]<\/a> New York State Office of the Attorney General. \u201c<a name=\"page-title\"><\/a>A.G. Schneiderman Launches Inquiry Into Cryptocurrency \u2018Exchanges\u2019.\u201d April 17, 2018. <a href=\"https:\/\/ag.ny.gov\/press-release\/ag-schneiderman-launches-inquiry-cryptocurrency-exchanges\">https:\/\/ag.ny.gov\/press-release\/ag-schneiderman-launches-inquiry-cryptocurrency-exchanges<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<br><br><div align=\"center\"><p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/bePatron?u=8420236\"><img src=\"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/become_a_patron_button.svg\" alt=\"Become a Patron!\" title=\"Become a Patron!\" width=217 height=51><\/a><br><p style=\"align:center;\" class=\"patreon-badge\"><i>Your subscriptions keep this site going. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/bePatron?u=8420236\">Sign up today!<\/a><\/i><\/p><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>My written evidence to the UK Treasury&#8217;s Digital Currencies Inquiry is finally up, as is everyone else&#8217;s.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[457],"class_list":["post-7324","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorised","tag-united-kingdom"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7324","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7324"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7324\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11853,"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7324\/revisions\/11853"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7324"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7324"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/davidgerard.co.uk\/blockchain\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7324"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}